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1 Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the topic of income inequality. Typical issues include
the evolution of income inequality over time in some particular region, the dierences in
income inequality across dierent regions, the eect of various policies on income inequality,
and conversely, the eect of income inequality on various economic variables.1 In order to
1See Goldberg and Pavcnik [17] for a recent survey on the eect of globalization on income inequality in
developing countries, and Helpman et al. [18] for a theoretical analysis of the eect of trade liberalization on
1address these and other similar questions one must rst be able to measure income inequality,
which is not a straightforward task.
The literature on income inequality measurement oers a plethora of inequality indices
but the extent to which they are appropriate is not at all obvious. To compare the perfor-
mance of dierent indices one may apply them to various income distributions and check
whether or not they contradict one's intuitions about income inequality. For instance, they
may be applied to two income distributions, one of which is believed to be more unequal than
the other, and all those indices that contradict our subjective judgment may be discarded.
Although this method may seem reasonable, it may not be very reliable, as discarding indices
based on intuition is not the best scientic practice. Just as optical illusions may induce us
to believe that one object is longer than another one while they are actually of equal length,
so a false impression may induce us to believe that one income distribution is more unequal
than another one, while in fact their level of inequality is the same.
Another, more cautious, way to evaluate inequality measures is to consider their proper-
ties at a more abstract level. We could compile a list of simple properties that a reasonable
inequality measure should satisfy and then check which inequality measures do actually sat-
isfy them. This method allows us to compare dierent indices in terms of the dierential
properties they do and do not satisfy, and has been successfully applied in the characteriza-
tion of families of Gini-type indices, the Theil index, and the family of generalized entropy
indices, among many others. In particular, Bourguignon [7] and Foster [15] have shown that
the Theil index of income inequality is the only index that satises several basic axioms as
well as a simple decomposability property, known as Theil-Decomposability. In an important
paper Shorrocks [23] shows that the generalized entropy indices are the unique indices (up
to a monotone transformation) that are consistent with the Lorenz partial order and satisfy
the ordinal property of aggegativity. Later on, Shorrocks [24] showed that aggregativity can
be replaced by the ordinal axiom of subgroup consistency.
Some properties of inequality indices are uncontroversial, to the extent that they are
income inequality.
2considered to be the dening properties of the bare concept of inequality measure. One
example is the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which postulates that the transfer of
income from a rich individual to a poorer one decreases inequality as long as the poor
individual does not become richer than the rich one. Given other basic properties, this
axiom is equivalent to requiring that the order be consistent with the Lorenz criterion.
Other axioms, though very convenient, are less uncontroversial. For example, some require
the inequality index to be decomposable in a particular way. Specically, given any partition
of a society into two subsocieties, they require that the overall inequality be decomposable
into the inequality between the subsocieties, and the inequality within them. Though useful
in applications, this decomposability is not at all a dening property of an inequality index.
In fact, there are well-known inequality indices that are not decomposable.
It is important to bear in mind that some axioms are ordinal in nature, while others
are cardinal. Ordinal axioms impose restrictions on how dierent income distributions are
ranked. The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, for instance, is an ordinal property in
that it compares two particular distributions and tells us which one is more unequal. It
does not, however, relate to the magnitude of the inequality dierence. Cardinal axioms,
on the other hand, impose restrictions on the functional form of the index that is used to
measure inequality. The decomposability property that Bourguignon [7] and Foster [15] use
to characterize the Theil index is cardinal, since it requires that the total inequality of a
region be a weighted sum of the inequalities of its subregions and the inequality between
these subregions. This property is lost if we apply a non-linear monotonic transformation to
the index.
In this paper we strip the decomposability property used by Bourguignon [7] and Fos-
ter [15] of all its cardinal content, and retain only its ordinal content. In particular, we
identify an ordinal and meaningful decomposability property which is weaker than Theil De-
composability. This ordinal decomposability property states the following. Suppose we have
two societies S and S0 with the same total income but not necessarily the same population
size. Identify a subsociety in each society with the same population size, n, and the same
3total income, y. The ranking of the two societies, S and S0, in terms of income inequality
should be independent of the way we distribute the total income y among the n members of
the subpopulation. We use this property, along with other well-known ordinal properties, to
characterize the Theil ordering of income inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After giving a short review of the related
literature in Section 2, we present the model and list examples of inequality indices in
Section 3. Section 4 states the axioms and the main characterization theorem, the proof of
which appears in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The axiomatic literature on inequality indices is quite vast. Weymark [28] denes a family of
generalized Gini absolute inequality indices, and characterizes it within the class of societies
with a xed population. He also denes a family of generalized Gini relative inequality
indices, which was axiomatically characterized by Ben Porath and Gilboa [5] within the
class of societies with a xed population and a xed income. Yaari [29], Bossert [6] and
Aaberge [1] provide characterizations of this family within a larger class of societies. Further
characterizations of the Gini indices can be found in Thon [27], Donaldson and Weymark [13,
14], Yitzhaki [30], and Barret and Salles [4]. The family of generalized entropy measures has
been studied by Cowell [10], Cowell and Kuga [11, 12], Shorrocks [22, 23], and Russell [21],
to name a few. Finally, Atkinson [2] introduces and characterizes the family of Atkinson
measures, which is further characterized by Lasso and Urrutia [19].2
One member of the family of general entropy indices is the Theil index, which has been
introduced by Theil [25]. Theil [25, 26] shows this index to have the following useful property
which, following Foster [15], we call Theil-Decomposability. The property can be described
as follows. Partition a society into two groups of income earners. We can dene its within-
group inequality as the weighted average of the income inequality levels of the two groups,
2For comprehensive surveys on income inequality measures, see Cowell [9] and Chakravarty [8].
4the weights being the income shares of each group. We can also dene the between-group
inequality as the inequality level of the original society after smoothing the income of each
group. In other words, between-group inequality is the inequality that would result if there
was no within-group inequality. It turns out that no matter how the original society is
partitioned, Theil's index measures its income inequality as the sum of the within-group and
between-group inequalities.
Bourguignon [7] used this decomposability property to axiomatically characterize the
Theil index. In particular, he showed that it is the only twice dierentiable index that
satises various uncontroversial axioms as well as Theil-Decomposability. Foster [15] shows
that the requirement of twice dierentiability can be replaced by continuity.3 In this paper
we show, albeit on a larger class of societies, that we can replace the cardinal axiom of Theil-
Decomposability by weaker ordinal axioms and still obtain the Theil inequality ordering.
Our proof is very dierent from those of Bourguignon [7] and Foster [15]. Bourguignon
heavily relies on the twice dierentiability of the index. Foster, in turn, relies on Lee's [20]
theorem to show that a particular restriction of any index that satises Theil decomposability
(and other uncontroversial axioms) must be a multiple of Shannon's measure of entropy.4
In contrast, we rely on a well-known characterization of the logarithmic functions to show
that a specic index that satises our axioms, restricted to particularly simple societies,
is in fact a logarithmic function.5 While Foster's proof consists mainly of showing that a
Theil-Decomposable index must be a multiple of Theil's measure, the most burdensome part
of our proof consists in showing that an inequality ordering that satises our axioms can be
represented by a Theil-Decomposable index. Once this is done, showing that this index is
3Foster's [15] main result further shows that continuity can be dispensed with by strengthening the
Directness axiom and assuming the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers instead.
4This restriction is the index applied only to two-person societies, with one person earning a proportion
t of the total income and the other one the remaining 1   t.
5These simple societies are ones where a proportion 1   t of the population has no income at all and the
remaining complementary proportion shares all of society's income evenly.
5in fact Theil's measure is less dicult.6 Our result is reminiscent of Frankel and Volij's [16]
characterization of the Mutual Information measure of segregation. The main dierence is
that Frankel and Volij, owing to an extensive use of an axiom of symmetry among dierent
ethnic groups and one of invariance to splitting of groups, are able to prove their result
without resorting to decomposability. In our case, however, since there are no multiplicity
of groups, we have to add a decomposability axiom.
An alternative but indirect proof of our result can be obtained if we strengthen our di-
rectness requirement to the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, and if we restrict attention
to the class of nite distributions. Indeed, Shorrocks [23, 24] shows that in this class, the
generalized entropy indices are the only ones (up to a monotonic transformation) that sat-
isfy symmetry, the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, replication invariance, homogeneity,
continuity, and subgroup consistency. Therefore, by checking that none of the generalized
entropy indices, except for the Theil index, satises our ordinal decomposability axiom, one
obtains a full characterization of it. Shorrocks's proof, however, is long and makes heavy
use of results on functional equations. Using the exibility awarded by a larger class of
distributions, we oer a direct and more elementary proof which we believe is easy to follow.
3 Denitions
An income group is a pair (n;y) where y  0 is an income level and n  0 is the mass of
people with income level y. A generalized society is a collection h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i of
income groups. A proper society, or simply, a society, is a generalized society such that for
some k = 1;:::;K, both yk, and nk are positive. An empty society is a generalized society
such that nk = 0 for all k = 1;:::K. We identify each society S with the society that is
obtained from it by deleting all its income groups with 0 population mass.
It is standard to restrict attention to societies h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i where nk = 1 for
6We should point out that for this part of our proof we cannot rely on Foster's result because we deal
with a class of societies that is larger than Foster's. Furthermore, his continuity axiom is dierent from ours.
6k = 1;:::;K, namely to the class of societies with a nite number of individuals. We choose
to work with a larger class where there is a continuum of agents for each income level. This
modeling choice is more exible and allows us to prove our result in a direct way. Needless
to say, models with a continuum of agents are pervasive in the economic literature, and
therefore it is useful to extend inequality indices to larger classes so that we can apply them
to such models.7 We denote by S the set of all proper societies. We also denote by S+ the
subclass of proper societies where all individuals have strictly positive incomes. Some indices
are not well-dened for societies outside S+. For our proof to be valid it is important that
the class is S and not just S+.
For any society S = h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i, we denote by jSj, the total level of income















that is obtained from S by redistributing S's income equally among
its members. Also, for any   0, S denotes the generalized society that is ob-
tained from S by multiplying the number of people in each income group by . That
is, S = h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i. For any two generalized societies S1 and S2, S1 [ S2
denotes the concatenation of the two. Note that the concatenation of an empty society with
a proper society is a proper society. Specically, if ES is an empty society and S any society,
then ES [ S = S. In particular, although for  = 0, S is not a proper society, with some
abuse of notation we will sometimes write S [ S0 meaning S0 when  = 0.
An inequality ordering is a complete and transitive binary relation < on S.8 For any
two societies S1 and S2, S1 < S2 means that S1's income distribution is at least as unequal
as S2's. Some orderings can be represented by an inequality index. An inequality index is
7Within the axiomatic literature mentioned above, Aaberge [1], Atkinson [2], Cowell [9], Donaldson and
Weymark [14], Yaari [29], and Yitzhaki [30] admit a continuum of agents.
8We denote by  and  the asymmetric and symmetric parts of <.
7a function I : S !R that assigns to each society in S a real number, that stands for the
society's inequality level. We say that an inequality index I : S !R represents the inequality
ordering < if for all societies S;S0 2 S, S < S0 if and only if I(S)  I(S0).
3.1 Examples of inequality indices
Example 1 The Theil index, T : S ! [0;1), is dened as follows.9













The Theil ordering is the ordering represented by the Theil index.
Example 2 The Second Theil index, T0 : S+ ! [0;1), is dened as follows.










Both T and T0 belong to the family of generalized entropy indices. The remaining indices
of this family are dened next.
Example 3 The Generalized Entropy index, GE : S+ ! [0;1), is dened as follows.












for  6= 0;1:
9We adopt the convention that 0ln(0) = 0.
8Researchers are sometimes interested in decomposable inequality indices. Decomposable
indices allow us to attribute total inequality to dierent factors. In particular, decompos-
able indices allow us to decompose total inequality into inequality between subsocieties and
inequality within subsocieties. Bourguignon [7] and Foster [15] used the following version
of decomposability in their characterizations of the Theil index.
Denition 1 [TD] We say that inequality index I is Theil-decomposable if for any two
societies S1 and S2,






I(S2) + I(S1 [ S2): (1)
The rst two terms of (1) represent the inequality within S1 and S2. This inequality is the
income-weighted average of the inequality of the two subsocieties as measured by I. The
last term of (1) represents the inequality between S1 and S2, and is the inequality that would
result if there was no inequality in either subsociety.
Note that Theil decomposability is a cardinal axiom. Nevertheless, it has very strong
ordinal implications. In this paper we identify one of these ordinal implications and, together
with other ordinal axioms, use them to characterize the Theil inequality ordering.
4 Axioms and the main result
We now present a set of axioms that an inequality ordering may satisfy. Before we state
the rst one, note that our denition of a society already exhibits a measure of anonymity.
Indeed, it does not specify the income of each individual but only the mass of people in each
income group. Our rst axiom strengthens this anonymity by allowing us to disregard how
income groups are displayed within a society.
Denition 2 [ANON] We say that < satises anonymity if










9 for all n1;n2 > 0 and y  0, and for all societies S, including the empty societies, such
that h(n1 + n2;y)i [ S 2 S, h(n1;y);(n2;y)i [ S  h(n1 + n2;y)i [ S:
The rst part of anonymity states that the order in which income groups are displayed
does not aect inequality. The second part states that one can divide an income group into
two income groups without aecting inequality as long as these two new groups have the
same income per capita as the original group.
The next two axioms embody the idea that we are interested in relative measures of
income inequality.
Denition 3 [HOM] We say that < satises homogeneity if for all h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i
in S, and for all  > 0, we have h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i  h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i.
Denition 4 [RI] We say that < satises replication invariance if for all h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i
in S, and for all  > 0, we have h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i  h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i.
Homogeneity states that only the relative distribution of income determines inequality. In
other words, one does not need to know the units in which income is measured (dollars, euros,
etc.) to determine whether one society has a more or less equal distribution than another.
Replication invariance states that if we replicate a society by multiplying each individual by
a xed positive constant, then inequality remains unaected. It is not the absolute number of
people who have any given income level that matters, but their proportion in the population.
It is easy to check that all the orderings listed in the previous section satisfy homogeneity
and replication invariance.
The previous two axioms dictate that a particular change in the society does not aect
its income inequality. The next axiom, on the other hand, dictates that other changes do
have a certain eect. In fact, it is the only axiom that provides circumstances under which
one society is more unequal than another.
10Denition 5 [SD] We say that < satises strong directedness if for all egalitarian societies
h(n;y)i, and for all h(n1;y1);(n2;y2)i such that n = n1 + n2, ny = n1y1 + n2y2, and y1 6= y2
we have h(n1;y1);(n2;y2)i  h(n;y)i.
Strong directedness is a stronger version of Foster [15]'s directedness. According to this
axiom, if one divides an egalitarian society into two income groups by transferring income
from some individuals to others, one obtains a new society with a more unequal distribution
of income. It is easy to check that all the indices listed in the previous section represent
orderings that satisfy strong directedness.
The next axiom is an ordinal implication of Theil-Decomposability.
Denition 6 [IND] We say that < satises Independence, if for all S1;S2 2 S such that
jS1j = jS2j and n(S1) = n(S2), and for all societies S 2 S,
S1 < S2 , S1 [ S < S2 [ S:
Independence is essentially what is known as subgroup consistency, which is closely related
to the notion of aggregativity of an index (see Shorrocks [23, 24]).10 It says that if a given
society is composed of two regions, and one of its regions' income becomes more unequally
distributed, then the income distribution of the whole society becomes more unequal as well.
The satisfaction of this axiom justies the application of distributive policies in subregions in
order to obtain results in the whole region. To illustrate, in order to reduce income inequality
in Asia, one would want to apply a policy that reduces inequality in India. But this would
be justied only if our measure of inequality satises IND. Otherwise, it may well be the case
that by reducing inequality in India we end up increasing inequality in Asia. An immediate
10Subgroup consistency requires only the if part of IND. Therefore, IND implies subgroup consistency.
Aggregativity, on the other hand implies IND. Shorrocks [24], however, shows that subgroup consistency
together with the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, homogeneity, continuity, and symmetry imply ag-
gregativity. Since we weaken the Pigou-Dalton principle and assume only Strong Directness we need to
reinforce subgroup consistency by assuming IND.
11consequence of Shorrocks [23, 24] results is that many indices, including the Gini index, fail
to satisfy Independence.
As mentioned above, IND is an ordinal implication of Theil-Decomposability. To see this,
let S1;S2 2 S be two societies such that jS1j = jS2j and n(S1) = n(S2), and let S 2 S be




jS2[Sj > 0. Then, if I is a Theil-Decomposable index,
I(S1 [ S)   I(S2 [ S) = I(S1) + I(S1 [ S)   I(S2)   I(S2 [ S)
= (I(S1)   I(S2));
since S1 = S2. Hence, I represents an ordering that satises IND.
In fact, for our results we do not need to assume Independence. It is enough to assume
a slightly weaker axiom which has a similar interpretation. Furthermore, the statement of
this axiom has the advantage of being easily comparable to the decomposability axiom that
will be introduced later.
Denition 7 [WIND] We say that < satises Weak Independence, if for all S1;S2 2 S such
that jS1j = jS2j and n(S1) = n(S2), and for all societies S;S0 2 S,
S1 [ S < S2 [ S ) S1 [ S
0 < S2 [ S
0:
It is clear that Independence implies Weak Independence. We will later show that Weak
Independence, Replication Invariance and Anonymity, jointly imply Independence.
The next axiom is another ordinal implication of Theil-decomposability.
Denition 8 [DEC] We say that < satises ordinal decomposability, if for all three societies
S1;S2;S 2 S, such that jS1j = jS2j, we have
S1 [ S < S2 [ S ) S1 [ S < S2 [ S: (2)
Ordinal decomposability states the following. Suppose we want to compare two societies,
S1[S and S2[S, in terms of income distribution. These two societies may not have the same
12population but they do have the same total income. Further, suppose that these two societies
share a common subsociety, S. That is, their intersection is not empty. To illustrate, think
of Russia, which belongs both to Europe and to Asia, and assume that Europe and Asia have
the same total income. Ordinal decomposability dictates that whether or not one society
is more unequal than the other is independent of the income distribution in the common
subsociety. Continuing with our example, DEC states that whether or not Europe has a more
unequal distribution than Asia is independent of how income is distributed within Russia.
In particular, it is enough to know whether Europe would have a more unequal distribution
than Asia if Russia's income was equally distributed among Russia's population.
This axiom suggests that in some circumstances one could identify and isolate the in-
equality within a subsociety from the inequality of the whole society. To see this, note that
for any S, the dierence between society (S1 [ S) and society (S1 [ S) is that in the rst
society the inequality within S has been eliminated while in the second it has not. Therefore
the requirement (2) in DEC suggests that income inequality in (S1 [ S) consists of the in-
equality in (S1 [S) and of a term that depends only on the inequality within S and on jS1j.
This kind of income dependent decomposability is much weaker than Theil Decomposability,
but turns out to be sucient, together with WIND and the other axioms, to imply it.
From their formal statement, it can be seen that both Weak Independence and Ordinal
Decomposability are some sort of separability axioms. They are, however, mutually indepen-
dent. Indeed, the generalized entropy indices satisfy WIND but not DEC (except, of course,
for the Theil index, which satises both). Furthermore, the index ( 1)bjSjcT(S) represents
an ordering that satises DEC but not independence.
As mentioned above, DEC is weaker than Theil-Decomposability. To see this, let




jS2[Sj. Assume that the index I
13satises TD. Then,
(S1 [ S) < (S2 [ S) ,
I(S1) + (1   )I(S) + I(S1 [ S)  I(S2) + (1   )I(S) + I(S2 [ S) ,
I(S1) + (1   )I(S) + I(S1 [ S)  I(S2) + (1   )I(S) + I(S2 [ S) ,
(S1 [ S) < (S2 [ S)
which means that DEC is satised.
The reader may wonder what the implications are of replacing the condition jS1j = jS2j in
the denition of DEC with the dual condition n(S1) = n(S2). In that case we would obtain a
population dependent decomposability axiom. As it turns out, among the generalized entropy
indices, only the second Theil measure, T0, satises this new axiom. Therefore, by restricting
attention to the class of nite population societies, this axiom along with the other axioms
used in Shorrocks [24] fully characterize T0. A modication of our proof, however, would not
suce to obtain a characterization of this index in the larger class that we consider in this
paper. The reason is that our proof crucially exploits the fact that there are societies with
zero per-capita income groups, and as we know, the second Theil index is not dened for
such societies.
The last axiom is a technical but standard continuity requirement that states that \sim-
ilar" societies have \similar" levels of income inequality.
Denition 9 [C] The inequality ordering < satises continuity if for all three societies S,
S0 and S00, the sets
f 2 [0;1] : S [ (1   )S
0 < S
00g and f 2 [0;1] : S
00 < S [ (1   )S
0g
are closed.
This axiom is analogous to the standard continuity axiom used in the expected utility the-
orem. Needless to say, it is weaker than directly assuming that < is represented by a
continuous index.
We are now ready to state our main result.
14Theorem 1 An inequality ordering dened on S satises anonymity, homogeneity, repli-
cation invariance, weak independence, ordinal decomposability, strong directedness, and
continuity if and only if it can be represented by the Theil inequality index.
5 Proof of Theorem 1
It is easy to check that the Theil ordering satises ANON, HOM, RI, SD, and C. It is well
known that the Theil index satises Theil-Decomposability. Therefore it satises WIND and
DEC as well.
Now, let < be an inequality ordering on S that satises anonymity, homogeneity, replica-
tion invariance, weak independence, ordinal decomposability, strong directedness, and con-
tinuity. We will show that is represented by the Theil index. We rst show that it satises
IND. Indeed, let S1 and S2 be two societies such that jS1j = jS2j and n(S1) = n(S2), and let
S 2 S. Assume that S1 [ S < S2 [ S. Then, by WIND
S1 [ S1 < S2 [ S1 < S2 [ S2:
Consequently, by RI and ANON, S1 < S2. The converse is shown analogously. Therefore,
< satises IND.
Let S0 = h(1;1)i be the society with population mass 1 and a uniformly distributed
income of one, and let S1=2 = h(1=2;0);(1=2;2)i be the society with population mass 1, in
which half of the population has income 0, and the other half has income 2. Note that S1=2
has income 1. Also note that by SD, S1=2  S0.
Lemma 1 All societies where total income is equally distributed among the population have
the same degree of income inequality. Further, for all societies S 2 S, S < S0.
Proof : Let S be a society with equally distributed income. By HOM, RI, and ANON,
S  S0. Also let S = h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i 2 S be an arbitrary society, and let Sk












































[ B = S
k+1:
Therefore, by transitivity, S = S1 < SK. But SK has only one income group, and hence, by
the rst part of the lemma, SK  S0. 
Lemma 2 Let S0 be a society with population 1 and income 1 such that S0  S0. If
0   <  < 1, then S0 [ (1   )S0  S0 [ (1   )S0:
Proof : By RI, (   )S0  (   )S0. By IND,
S
0 [ (   )S
0 [ (1   )S0  S
0 [ (   )S0 [ (1   )S0:
By ANON, S0 [ (1   )S0  S0 [ (1   )S0.

Lemma 3 Let S0 be a society with population 1 and income 1 such that S0  S0. Then,
for any society S 2 S such that S0 < S < S0, there is a unique  2 [0;1] such that
S  
S
0 [ (1   
)S0
Proof : By C, the sets f 2 [0;1] : S0 [ (1   )S0 < Sg and f 2 [0;1] : S < S0 [ (1   )S0g
are closed. Since S0 < S < S0, they are not empty. Since < is complete, their union is [0;1].
Therefore, since the unit interval is connected, the intersection of the two sets is not empty.
16By Lemma 2, this intersection must contain a single element. This single element is the 
we are looking for. 
Lemma 4 For any society S 2 S such that jSj = n(S) = 1, there is a unique   0 such
that S [ S0  S0 [ S1=2.
Proof : If S1=2 < S < S0, then by Lemma 3 there is a unique  2 [0;1] such that
S  S1=2 [ (1   )S0. Then, by IND and ANON,
S [ 
S0  





If, on the other hand, S  S1=2, by Lemma 3 there is a unique  2 [0;1] such that
S [ (1   )S0  S1=2. Since S1=2  S0,  > 0. Then,
S [
(1 )




 S0 [ S0  1
S1=2 [ S0 by IND
S [ 1
S0  1
S1=2 [ S0 by ANON.
Therefore, 1
 is the  we are looking for. 
Lemma 4 allows us to dene an index r : S ! R by
r(S) = ;
where  is the unique number that satises b S [ S0  S0 [ S1=2, and b S is the society that
is obtained from S by normalizing its population and income to 1.
Lemma 5 The index r represents the inequality order <.
17Proof : Let S and S0 be two societies and assume that S0 < S. By RI and HOM we can
assume that jSj = jS0j = 1 and n(S) = n(S0) = 1. Let  and 0 be dened by
S [ S0  S0 [ S1=2 (3)
S
0 [ 
0S0  S0 [ 
0S1=2: (4)
We need to show that 0  . Assume by contradiction that  > 0. Then,
S0 [ S0 < S [ S0 by IND
 S0 [ S1=2 by (3)
 S0 [ 0S1=2 [ (   0)S1=2 by ANON
 S0 [ 0S1=2 [ (   0)S0 by IND and S1=2  S0,
 S0 [ 0S0 [ (   0)S0 by (4) and IND
 S0 [ S0 by ANON,
which cannot be true. 
The next proposition implies that the index r satises Theil-Decomposability.









Proof : Let S and S0 be two societies with populations n and m, respectively. By RI
and HOM, we can assume without loss of generality that n + m = 1, and jS [ S0j = 1. Let




[ S0  S0 [ S1=2 (5)
b S [ S0  S0 [ S1=2: (6)
where b S is the society that is obtained from S by normalizing its population and income so
that they are both equal to 1. We need to show that
(S [ S
0) [ (jSj + )S0  S0 [ (jSj + )S1=2: (7)








has population n and income jSj. It follows from (6), using RI and HOM, that
S [ S  S [ S

1=2: (8)
Concatenating (k   1)(S0 [ S1=2) to both sides of Equation (5), we obtain
S [
Z1 z }| {
S
0 [ S0 [ (k   1)(S0 [ S1=2)  k(S0 [ S1=2) by IND and ANON
 k
jSj(S [ S
1=2) by HOM and RI
 S [












Note that since jSj < 1 and   0, our choice of k implies that jSj=k < 1, and therefore
subsociety Z2 is well-dened. Since jZ1j = jZ2j = jS0j + k + (k   1), by DEC,
S [
Z1 z }| {
S
0 [ S0 [ (k   1)(S0 [ S1=2)  S [























k )S [ S
1=2)
 jSj(S0 [ S1=2) [ (k   (1 + )jSj)S0 [ kS1=2
 S0 [ (jSj + )S1=2 [ (k   1   jSj
| {z }
>0
)S0 [ (k   1)S1=2
where the second line follows from (8) and IND, the third line from HOM and RI, and the
last one from ANON. On the other hand, by ANON
S [ S0 [ S0 [ (k   1)(S0 [ S1=2)  S [ S0 [ (jSj + )S0 [ (k   1   jSj)S0 [ (k   1)S1=2:





S0 [ (k   1)S1=2

 S0 [(jSj + )S1=2 [
 
k
S0 [ (k   1)S1=2

19Since S [S0 [(jSj+)S0 and S0 [(jSj + )S1=2 have the same population and income,
we can apply IND and obtain
S [ S
0 [ (jSj + )S0  S0 [ (jSj + )S1=2;
which is what we wanted to prove. 















Proof : The proof is by induction and is left to the reader. 
We now dene a class of simple societies. For each  2 (0;1), let S =
h(;0);(1   ;1=(1   )i be the society with population mass 1 in which a proportion 
of the population has income 0, and the proportion (1   ) of the population has income
1=(1   ). The next proposition shows that r, when applied to these societies, induces a
well-known function.
Proposition 2 For all  2 (0;1], r(S1 ) =  log2 .
Proof : Let h : (0;1] ! R be dened by h() = r(S1 ). By denition of r,
h()  0 for all  2 (0;1]: (9)
Also,
h(1=2) = r(S1=2) = 1: (10)
We will now show that
h(pq) = h(p) + h(q) for all p;q 2 (0;1]: (11)























[ h(1   q;0)i:





























by HOM and RI
= r(S1 p) + r(S1 q);
which shows that (11) holds. It is known that the only function on (0;1] that satises (9-11)
is  log2.11 
Proposition 3 The index r is a positive multiple of the Theil index.
Proof : Let S = h(n1;y1);:::;(nK;yK)i 2 S be a society. Assume without loss of generality
that nk > 0 for k = 1;:::;K. We need to show that r(S) = aT(S) for some a > 0. If K = 1,
the result is obvious. So assume K  2. By RI we can assume without loss of generality
that n(S) = 1. Similarly, by HOM we can assume without loss of generality that
P
yk = 1.
Therefore jSj2 < jSj =
P

































11See Theorem 0.2.5 in Acz el and Dar oczy [3].




























































































































































We have axiomatically characterized the Theil ordering of income inequality. In addition
to the uncontroversial axioms of anonymity, homogeneity, replication invariance, strong di-
rectedness and a standard continuity property, we appealed to an independence and to a
decomposability axioms. These two axioms are ordinal implications of Theil Decomposabil-
ity, the central axiom in Bourguignon [7] and Foster [15] in their characterization of the Theil
index. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst fully ordinal characterization of this
index.
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